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ABSTRACT 
In discussions about different international monetary arrangements  it is often 
maintained that exchange rate variability has a negative influence on international  trade and 
foreign investment.  This paper addresses one specific aspect of this general issue, namely the 
effect of exchange rate variability  on capital flows and international  portfolio diversification. 
More precisely, we examine how different monetary  policies-  - and among those, policies that 
aim at  stabilizing  exchange rates-  - determine the  risk characteristics  of nominal assets, and 
how these risk characteristics  determine international portfolio composition and trade in 
assets, when international  asset markets  are incomplete. 
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SWEDEN I. Introduction 
Iii popular  discussions about the merits of different  international  monetary 
arrangements  one often hears the argument  that increased exchange rate  variability has a 
negative influence on international  trade and capital flows.  Yet there arc few serious 
analyses in the international trade and finance literature  of how exchange rate variability 
affects trade and-capital  flows.  This paper addresses a specific, but also a very basic, 
question within this general issue, namely the effect of exchange rate variability  on capital 
flows and international  portfolio diversification in different assets: How do different rules for 
monetary policies- - and among  those,  rules  that aim at  stabilizing exchange rates-  - influence 
the risk characteristics  of nominal assets?  How do these risk characteristics  in turn affect 
international  portfolio composition and trade in assets, when international  asset markets  are 
incomplete? 
The motivation for our focus on nominal assets is evident.  From an  empirical point 
of view, an overwhelming proportion of international capital flows are in assets denominated 
in some currency with fixed nominal interest payments.  From a theoretical  point of view, 
monetary policy can exert a direct effect only on the risk structure of  nominal assets and any 
effect on the risk structure of  real assets must be indirect via some other non- neutrality.  It 
is also evident that international  asset markets  must be incomplete for our analysis to be 
interesting.  For if markets  were complete the risk characteristics of  nominal assets would 
not matter. 
Previous literature in the macro tradition  on international  portfolio investment  in 
monetary open economies has largely relied on the "portfolio balance' approach.  That 
approach specifies asset demand functions directly and does not derive them from a 
maximization problem given the risk- return characteristics of available assets.  (See Branson 
and Henderson (19S5) for a survey of the portfolio balance approach.)  Such an approach is 
subject to the "Lucas critique",  however. Since our purpose in this paper  is precisely to 
investigate how differeot policy rules affect the trade pattern in assets, we cannot rely on a 
portfolio balance approach. Previous literature in the finance tradition  on international  portfolio diversification 
has iideed derived asset demands froni first principles, hut has typically treated the 
stochastic processes for asset returns and exchange rates as exogenous rather than 
determined  by monetary policies in general equilibrium  (see for instance Fama and  Farber 
(1979), Crauer, Litzenberger and Stehle (1976), and Kouri (1977)). 
An integration  of monetary  policies in general equilibrium is indeed undertaken in the 
international  asset pricing models of Lucas (1982), Stulz (1984) and Svensson (1985). But 
the focus in these  papers is on prices and exchange rates and not on the trade pattern in 
assets.  Since a  perfectly pooled eqnilibrinm is assumed, the trade pattern is indeed trivial.i 
A closer antecedent to the present paper is I-lelpman and Razin (1982) who use a framework 
very similar to the one we  will use.  Their focus is on the optimality properties of different 
exchange rate regimes though, not on the associated trade patterns. 
Svensson (1988a) studies the effect of monetary policies on the trade pattern in 
nominal assets by adopting an "indirect" approach, which exploits the general Law of 
Comparative  Advantage,  as developed by Deardorff (1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980). 
The indirect approach first derives a correlation between the trade pattern in assets and 
autarky asset price  differences, and then explains autarky asset price differences by 
differences in countries  technologies, preferences, and monetary  policies.  Tisis  is convenient 
because it is not necessary to solve for the explicit equilibrium trade pattern; it is sufficient 
to solve for the simpler antarky equihibrinm. But for our purpose the approach has the 
disadvantage that the results on tlse trade pattern are only in the form of correlations; tisere 
are no specific results on particular  assets. 
To get specific results, we instead adopt a "direct" approacis. That is, we solve 
explicitly for the trade equilibrium and analyze the determinants  of tlse aggregate capital 
That is, relative to antarky each country (in a two- country world) exports half of 
its assets and imports  half of  the otiser country's assets.  Still, capital movements and 
correlations between key macro variables like investment,  the current account, output, etc., 
can be  studied, as in Stockman and Svensson  (1987), hot any current and capital account 
movements are due exclusively to revaluation of domestically i2a5l assets relative to foreign 
based assets, isot to cisauges us the ownership of assets. account, as well as its composition into trade in distinct nominal bonds.  We do this in a 
general equilibrium  where price levels, exchange rates, and asset returns  are determined  by 
monetary  policies.  Most of tIme equilibria differ from  the perfectly pooled equilibrium even 
when countries  have identical preferences.  We also  consider equilibria when COuntrieS 
preferences differ, more precisely when attitudes to risk  differ.  Our approach  relies to a 
considerable extent on a recent paper by Gordon and Varian (1987) which develops an 
intertemporal  CAPM model of trade in risky assets between barter economies.2 
A limitation  of our analysis is that we postulate that international  financial markets 
are incomplete, without attempting to integrate any reason for that inconspleteness— 
— such as 
moral hazard,  adverse  selection  or costly state verification-- into the analysis.  Instead we 
simply assume that the only internationally  traded assets are nominal bonds, denominated 
in each currency, and indexed bonds.  In spite of outputs being random, we rule out trade in 
stocks and claims to national Outputs by assumption.3 
A new element in our paper is to apply, in the context of the international  trade in 
assets, Selden's (1978) formulation of preferences. Selden's so called OCE (Ordinal 
Certainty  Equivalence) approach allows a distinction between intertemporal  preferences and 
attitudes towards risk, a distinction that is blurred in the usual  expected utility framework. 
Allowing for this distinction may  be particularly important  in an analysis of international 
portfolio choice, since we want to know what capital flows arise from intertemporal 
preferences and what ones arise from risk aversion.  As far as we know, our paper is the first 
2  Gordon and Varians (1986) focus  is on the effect of taxes on prices of 
internationally  traded assets.  They demonstrate,  among other things, a result similar to the 
optimum— tariff one, nansely that asset terms—  of— trade can be affected by taxation so as to 
improve national welfare. 
Cole (1986) examines the effect of different kinds of assets (ex post securities, 
Arrow- Debreu securities,  Helpman- Razin equities) on variance and covariance of key real 
variables, like Output, consumption,  and trade balance. 
The restriction on trade in claims on national outputs is perhaps easier to defend 
than the restriction on trade in stocks, since the former partly captures the difficulty in 
trading claims to human capital.  From the viewpoint of financial equilibrium,  we thus have 
a model where sonic risk is not directly  marketable.  This is not common in the finance 
literature,  but an early contribution  is Mayers (1973) analysis of non- marketable risk in the 
CAPM model. paper to look at equilibrium capital flows  using the OCR formulation.4 
The paper is organized in the following way.  Section 2 presents the real aspects of 
the model and the general equilibrium.  Section 3 presents the monetary aspects and the 
differeot policy rules for niooetary policy. Section 4 examines the trade pattero in nominal 
bonds and indexed hoods for different policy conflguratioos in the world economy.  In 
particular, it examioes the effects ois the aggregate capital account aod its compositioo of 
adoptiog  policy rules in the foros of exchaoge rate targets, tisat do limit exchaoge rate 
variability.  Some conclusions and possible extensioos are mentioned in Section 5.  Ao 
appendix includes some technical details. 
2. The Real Economy 
/ 
The economy  is a monetary economy with cash- in- advance constraints  in goods 
markets.  However, from a presentational point of view, it is easier to postpone the 
discussion of monetary  issues.  Accordingly, this section abstracts  entirely from monetary 
issues and deals only with the real economy, while money and monetary  policy is introduced 
in the next section.5 
We study a simple general equilibrium model of  a world economy with two countries: 
the home country  and the foreign country.  Foreign variables and parameters are indexed 
with an  asterisk . There are two time periods, 1 and 2.  Period 1 and 2 variables and 
parameters are indexed with superscripts.  In each period there is one perishable and 
internationally  traded good, which is produced and consumed by both cOuntries.  Period 1 
outputs are exogenous and certain, with home and foreign output denoted by y1 and y*'• 
Period 2 outputs, y2 and  y*2,  are also exogenous but uncertain.  We call s = (y2,y*2) the 
Svensson (1988b) uses the OCE framework when applying the "indirect"  approach 
of the law of comparative advantage to trade in risky real assets. 
5  The model  is similar to the ones of  Helpman (1981) (except it Isas uncertainty  and 
only two periods), Helpman and Rasin (1982) (except it has no uncertainty  in period  1), 
Lucas (1982) (except it has possibly incomplete markets and only two periods), Persson 
(1982, 1984)  (except it has uncertainty and only two periods), and Stockman (1983) (except 
it lsas cash in advance instead of money  in the utility function). state (of the world).  The state s is assumed to be bivariate  normal, with  means  and 
variances  and ,  and covariance 
As discussed in the introduction,  international  asset markets  are assumed to be 
incomplete.  In addition  to the national moneys, there are only three internationally  traded 
assets: one indexed bond, and nominal bonds denominated in home and foreign currency. 
The inclusion of the indexed bond is for convenience: it greatly simplifies the solution of the 
model. 
The indexed bond, denoted by subindex 0, has a state-  dependent home— currency 
return of P2(s) or a  state— dependent foreign currency return  of P2(s); P2(s) and P*2(s) 
being the home and foreign price level in state s.  Its real return- 
— the return in terms of the 
one good--  is thus riskless and equal to unity in each state.  The price  of  an indexed bond (in 
terms of the  good) on the period 1 asset market is denoted by q0.7 
The nominal bonds are discount bonds paying one unit of currency in each state. 
Their  real returns are thus risky.  The home (cnrrencv) bond has state-  dependent real 
return d(s) = 1/P2(s) and the foreign (currency) bond has real return d11 = 1/P*2(s).  Iii 
the remainder of this section, we shall refer to the home and foreign bonds as the  risky 
assets.  \Ve let d(s) denote the return vector on the risky assets, that is d(s) = 
(d11(s),d(s)).  \Ve shall later  on— 
— in section 3—— make assunsptions that make d  and d 
jointly  normally distributed.  Further, we let  denote the variance- covariance matrix of  the 
risky asset returns  and  and  denote the covariance (vectors) of home and foreign 
output with these returns.  The asset prices of risky assets (in terms of the good) are denoted 
by  and  and  Q is the asset price vector (QQ). 
Let us  now, after these preliminaries, look at the decision problem of the 
representative  consumer in the home country.  There are no assets outstanding  initially, so 
his only source of income in the first period is from home output. The home consumer owns 
6  The assurnptioil  of normality is, as usual, problematic,  since it implies that OutpUts 
can be negative with positive probability. 
7  The assumption  of one consumption good implies that the same indexed l)OUd is 
riskless for all investors. Ii 
the borne firm and claims to output (shares) are not traded internationally  by assumption. 
lie can boy first period consuioption c1  and trade on the international  asset market. his 
imports, and thus his eisd—  of— period holdings, of riskiess indexed bonds are denoted by z0, 
and his insports of risky assets (home and foreign bonds), by 5m and 5n  Letting  z denote 
the import  vector of risky assets, zm'zn' we can write the consnmer's period  1  bodget 
constraint  as 
c1 + q0z0 + Q'z = y1,  (2.la) 
where Q'z denotes the inner product QiZm + 
In period 2 he consomes in state a his income from period 2 ontpot and the returns  on 
his assets8 
c2(s) = y2 + a0 + d(s)'z.  (2.lh) 
The consumer's preferences are formulated as a special case of Selden (1978,  1979). 
Following Selden's approach, we separate  time preferences (intertemporal  preferences) and 
risk  preferences (attitude towards risk) of the consumer in the following way.  The firn 
preferences are given by the  intertemporal  and additively separable utility function 
U(c') + fiU(c2),  (2.2a) 
where fi is a discount factor, 0 c  < 1, and where c2 denotes the certainty  equivalent  of 
risky period 2 consonsption.  The risk preferences are given by the atemporal  utility function 
C) 
V(c'(s)), by which the certainty  equivalent period 2 consumption is defined as 
V(c2) = EV(c2(s)),  (2.2b) 
where  E is the expectations operator.9  Further, we assume that there isconstant absolute 
risk aversion, 
S  Since outputs may be negative with positive  probability  by our assumption that 
outputs are normally distributed,  we have a  possibility of bankruptcy if  consumption  is 
constrained to be non- negative.  We  ignore this problem by letting consumption  be negative 
if necessary. 
Selden (1978, 1979) does not restrict the time preferences to be additively  separable. 
When the time preferences are additiviy separable, and the risk prefereisces coincide with the 
time preferences (us the sense that the functions U(  )  and V(S) are identical), the 
preferences are identical to expected- utility von Neunsann-  hilergenstern preferences. V(c2(s))  7>0.  (2.2c) 
The  specification  in  (2.2)  and  (lie  assumption  that out puts and asset returns are normally 
distributed  imply 
= 2  - 7cJ2,  (2.3) 
where c2 is the mean and  the variance of period 2 consumption.  Thus, the exact 
exl)ression for the  risk premium"  depends only on (lie first two moments of period 2 
consumption.  Given the structure  of the model, these moments satisfy 
= -,2 + 
z0 + az,  and  (2.4a) 
Ccc = 
chh + z'az + 2oldz.  (2.4b) 
The above specification of preferences and budget constraints leads to (lie following 
first- order conditions for the home country's  imports of riskless assets (indexed bonds), 
f31J(c2)/U(cl)  q0,  (2.5) 
and for the imports  of risky assets (nominal bonds), 
a - 7hd 
-  7CZ — q,  (2.6) 
where  q is the vector of relative asset prices q = (qqj1)  (Q1/q0,Q11/q0).  Repeating an 
exactly  analogous argument  for the foreign country, leads to analogous first- order  conditions 
= 
q0,  and  (2.5*) 
a- 7f-7z=q.  (2.6*) 
We can now study  equilibrium prices and quantities  in the first-  period asset  markets. 
Equilibrium  in the markets for risky assets requires world imports  of both  assets to be zero, 
viz 
z+z*=0,  (2.7) 
which together with  the first order conditions (2.6) yields 
q = a - 
7wC\Vd.  (2.s) 
Flere,  a 1/(1/7 + 1/) is a measure of the world- wide absolute rate of risk  aversion and 
wd  is the covariance (vector) between world output, w2 = 1,2 + y2, and the returns on 
risky assets. The equilibrium (relative)  prices on risky assets are thus determined in a very simple way.  Using the expression (2.8) together with the first— order conditions,  we can solve 
for the equilibrium import vector of risky assets (nominal bonds) as 
z = a  (aafd 
- 
oahd),  (2.9) 
where as (1/7)/1/7) + (1/p))  and n  a (1/7*)/1/7) + (1/p)) are normalized 
measures of absolute risk tolerance (the reciprocal of risk  aversiou).  The equilibrium  import 
of risky assets thus depends on tlse attitudes  towards risk in the two countries,  on tlse risk 
properties of the assets, and on the covariance betweee asset returns and outputs. 
it is slightly more complicated to represent equilibrium in the market  for riskiess 
assets (indexed bonds).  To do that, let us define "certainty  equivalent  risky period 2 income 
(net of indexed bonds)" x2 by 
x2 a c2 - 
z0.  (2.10) 
We can express x2 as 
x=y+d'z- 7Ucc/2  (2.lla) 
where the  variance of second-  period consumption, jygn equilibrium in the markets for risky 
assets, satisfies 
Ccc = 
ahh - a(2- a)ohdi ahd + 20*2a1d5  °d + a*2afdo  aid.  (2.llb) 
Next, define the "demand price  function" q0(z0) implicitly by 
flU (z +  x  ) 
q  =  ,  (2.12) 
U(y  - 
q0(z0  + q'z)) 
with x2 given by (2.11) and z given by (2.9).  Thus, q0(z0) is the demand price for riskless 
assets given equilibrium in the markets for risky assets.  It is easy to show that the condition 
for q0(•) to be downward sloping is 
U/Uc < q(z0 + q'z),  (2.13) 
where U  denotes Ujy' 
- 
q0(z0 + q'z)),  etc.  The left- hand side of the inequality  is 
proportional to the intertemporal  substitution  effect and the right-  hand side is proportional 
to the income or "terms- of- trade" effect.  Thus, only a strongly positive income effect-  - due 
to a large  total  asset export- -  can make 
q0( ) positively  sloped. The foreign demand  price 
for indexed bonds q(z) is similarly defined.  Then, q( )  is downward sloping under the same coiiditioii that 
(10 is downward sloping, only that the left— hand side is replaced by 
UJtJ*  with  = U(y*l 
- 
q0(z0 + qz)), etc.  We  assume that condition (2.13) and its 
foreign analog are fulfilled. 
Since  = - 
z0 in equilibrium, the condition for equilibrium  in the market for riskless 
assets can be written as 
q0(z0) = q(-z0).  (2.14) 
This  condition can be solved for the equilibrium home country  import of  indexed bonds. 
Under the assumptions about the slopes of the demand price functions, the equilibrium is 
unique. 
\Ve note that we can write the budget constraint (2.la) as 
(c1-y1) + q0(z0 + q'z) = 0,  (2.15) 
and interpret it as a period 1 balance- of- payments- constraint.  The first term is the current 
account deficit and the second is the capital account deficit, consisting of  the value of 
indexed bonds import  q0z0 and of nominal bonds import q0qz = Q'z.  In the two-period 
framework the capital  account is relative to autarky; it is not the  change in overall holding 
of foreign assets from period to period. 
3. Money and Monetary  Policy 
We  introduce  money by postulating cash- in- advance constraints  in goods markets. 
Our way of modeling these constraints follows closely the approach pioneered by Helpman 
(19S1) and used in many subsequent papers in international finance.  A similar formulation 
to the one we will use here, also in the context  of a two- period uncertainty  model, has 
recently been used by Svensson (l9SSa), and we refer the reader to that paper for a detailed 
discussion on the institutional  setting.  The implications of money market equilibrium (with 
binding liquidity  constraints)  and goods market  equilibrium is that the period 1 price levels 
in the home and foreign countries obey the simple quantity-  theory equations 
P1 = M1/y1,  and  (3.1) 
P  = N'/y,  (3.1*) 10 
where M' and N' denote  the home and foreign period 1  money supply.  The period 1 
exchange rate follows from the law of one price, 
e' = '/'  .  (3.2) 
Similarly, the period 2 state-  dependent price levels satisfy 
P2(s) = M2(s)/y2,  and  (3.3) 
= N2(s)/y*2,  (3.3) 
and the state-  dependent period 2 exchange rate is given by 
e2(s) = P2(s)/P*2(s).  (3.4) 
The above simplistic formulation is obviously very restrictive.  There is no 
uncertainty  abont relative prices, and PPP holds.  But it is also very useful from a  modeling 
point of  view and allows us to focus on how monetary policy affect real returns on nominal 
assets.  Since outputs are exogenous, monetary policy in the two countries will determine the 
price levels and the exchange rate in each state.  This means that once monetary  policy is 
formulated,  the risk- returo properties of  home and foreign currency bonds are also 
determined and can be taken  as given in the real equilibrium that we studied in the previous 
section.  The real returns on home and foreign bonds are by equations  (3.3) simply given by 
dm(5) = 1/P2(s) = y2/M2(s) and  (3.5) 
dn(5) = 1/P*2(s)  y*2/N2(s). 
The resulting recursivity of the model simplifies the analysis considerably.  If, for instance, 
money demand would depend on consumption instead of on output, the recursivity would 
break down. 
Monetary  policies in the home and foreign country determine  the period  1 and period 
2 money supplies.  In the subsequent study of  risk and asset trade,  we shall distinguish a few 
benchmark policy rules for period 2 monetary policies.  The benchmark policy rules all have 
the property that the target variable is stabilized in the sense of becoming 
state- independent. 
The first policy rule is when the government pursues a monetary or a  nominal GDP 
target.  In our model, this requires that the money supply is niade state-  independent.  It 11 
Follows from  (3.3) that under such a target, the home government sets 
M2(s) = NI2,  for all s,  (3.6) 
vliere  Ni  is the target for nomnisal GDP.  As can he seen from (3.3), this results in home 
nominal GDP, P2(s)y2,  being constant  across states of the world.  Analogously, foreign 
nominal GDP targeting  requires 
N2(s) = N2  for all s.  (3.6*) 
Under the second policy rule, the government PU5UCS an inflation taret.  From 
(3.3), this policy requires the home government to set the second- period money supply in a 
state-  dependent way, namely 
M2(s) = (1+r)P'y2, for all s,  (3.7) 
where r  is the chosen inflation target.  Hence  the implicit period 2 price level target is 
P2(s) = 2  (l+ir)P1 for all s.  (In our framework, an inflation target and a period 2 price 
level target are equivalent.)  A foreign inflation target implies 
N2(s) = (1+g*)P*ly2,  for all s.  (37*) 
Finally, the governments may adopt exchange rate targets. Here, we must 
distinguish whether the two governments do or do not coordinate their policies.  An 
uncoordinated exchange rate target adopted by the home government,  from (3.3) and (3.4) 
requires it to set the money supply in the following,  state- dependent way 
M2(s) = N2(s)y2/y*2, for all s,  (3.8) 
where  is the target value of the period 2 exchange rate.  If instead the two governments 
agree to coordinate their policies and adopt a coordinated exchange rate target ,  they have 
one remaining  degree  of freedom.  The remaining degree of freedom is used to set the world 
money Supply 112(s)  M2(s) + N2(s), which is possibly state dependent.  From (3.3) and 
(3.4), it follows that, given the world money supply 112(5), the two individual money 
supplies must be  set according to 
M2(s) = JJ2(5)y2/yV2,  for all s, and  (3.9) 
9  9  9-  w) 
N(s) = I.1(s)y*ey  ,  for all s.  (3.9*) 
Each country's  money supply has to be set in proportion to that country's  share in world 12 
output in state a.  The coordinated exchange rate target can be associated with either a 
world nominal GDP target or a world inflation target. A world nominal (IDP target implies 
112(5) = 112  for all s,  (3.10) 
which results in a constant world nominal GDP, p2(5)yw2 = 112 for all s.  A world inflation 
j'et, with an implicit period 2 world price level target P2(s) = P2 = P1(1 +z) for all a, 
implies 
H2(s) = p2w2  for all s.  (3.11) 
That is, world money supply  is set proportional to world output. 
In this model it does not matter whether the governments undertake open market 
operations or  foreign exchange interventions to affect price levels and exchange rates.  The 
only thing that matters is the resulting effect on money supplies.  There are two reasons for 
this. First, there is is Ricardian equivalence, since consumers have rational  expectations and 
are as  long- lived as the economy, and since lumpsum net transfers are available.  Second, 
the transactions  structure  is such that each country's  representative  consumer chooses to 
begin period 2 with zero holdings of the other country's currency.  Then any seignorage 
collected by each government is a tax on their own citizens only.  See Svensson (1988a) for 
further discussion of this.  The consequence  for our analysis is that we  need only consider 
monetary policies in terms of direct money supply rules. 
This completes the  specification of the different possible rules for monetary  policy. 
As we shall see in the next section, the risk properties of the available nominal bonds hinge 
crucially upon which combination of policy rules that the two countries adopt. 
4. Asset Trade 
In this section we shall examine the aggregate capital account and the underlying 
trade pattern in nominal bonds and indexed bonds for the different stylized policy rules 
mentioned in section 3.  In particular, we shall compare the trade pattern in nomiual and 
indexed bonds (zns, zn and z0) and the capital account deficit (q0(z0 + q'z))  in a situation 
wisen the home  and foreign country pursues specified monetary policies, and  in a situation 13 
when the home country instead  adopts  an uncoordinated  exchange  rate target.  At the end 
we shall also discuss what happens when the two countries adopt a coordinated  exchange 
rate target. 
a) Uome Exchange  Rate Tarct vs. hlonie Nominal (11)P target 
with a Forcien  Nominal GDP Target 
\Ve start with the situation when the home and foreign  countries  both have an 
individual nominal  GDP  target, as given by equations (3.6).  Substitution of equations  (3.6) 
into the real return expressions (3.5) reveals that with these policy rules the expected return 
vector d and the variance/covariance  matrix  are given by 
-9 
-  y  a5 °hf  d=  _*9  and =  .  (4.1) 
y  °if ff 
In other words,  home and foreign  nominal bonds become  equivalent  to claims to  home  and 
foreign  Output,  respectively.  -We denote this circumstance  by 
m=h  and n=f.  (4.2) 
In the interest of brevity, we shall somewhat imprecisely refer to claims to home and foreign 
outputs  as home and foreign  stocks.  Substitution  of (4.1) into (2.9) immediately gives tile 
trade pattern in nominal  bonds, namely 
z1 = - a < 0  and  = a> 0.  (4.3) 
The home country exports home bonds and imports foreign  bonds.  Since home  and foreign 
bonds are  equivalent  to home and foreign  stocks, the home  Country  diversifies  its portfolio 
by effectively trading  home  stocks for foreign  stocks.  In equilibrium the home country then 
holds a portfolio of both home and foreign  stocks. 
Substitution  of (4.2)  in (2.8) gives tile  equilibrium prices (relative to indexed  bonds) 
of home and foreign  bonds, 
= 
q11 = 2 -  and  q  = 
qf = y2 - 7Wwf  (4.4) 
Here, q11 and qf denote the (hypothetical) prices of home and foreign  stocks and °',vli and 
wf  denote  the covariance between world period 2 output, w2 = y2 + y*2, and home and 14 
foreign outlnlt,  respectively.  We use (4.3) and (4.4) to compute  Z: the aggregate trade in 
nominal  bonds 
Z a ('z = 
Calf 
— 
0Cll  = rl  (4.5) 
where  = 
q11 + fif is the (hypothetical)  price (relative to the indexed bond) of claims to 
world poriod 2 output. \Ve see that the home country effectively holds a share a of claims to 
home output (the term oq), and that the aggregate trade in nominal bonds is the difference 
between that portfolio and an endowment consisting of home stocks (the term q15).  Tins if 
of course an example of a  familiar mutual- fund resuk fu the CAPM model. 
Numerous asymmetries between countries can he examined.  In order to restrict the 
number  of cases we limit the differences between countries to period 2 outputs being 
imperfectly correlated, and to attitudes towards risk.  Let us therefore assume that the 
countries have the same period 1 output, and that the marginal probability  distribution of 
their period 2 output is the same, but that their period 2 output may be less than perfectly 
correlated.  More specifically, unless otherwise stated, we  now assume 
1  1 -2  - 
y  =y  , y  =y  ,and abh= aff.  (Al) 
It follows directly  from (Al) that hf' the covariance between home and foreign period 2 
output, is bounded by - 
9hh ￿  e)f  hh 
We shall also assume, unless otherwise stated, that the countries have the same time 
preferences, that is the same subjective discount factor and intertemporal  utility function, 
fl= and  U(.)=U*(.).  (A2) 
Finally, we shall assume either that the two countries have the same absolute risk 
aversion, 
7 = 7*  (that is, a = a* = 1/2),  (A3a) 
or that the home  country  is more risk averse, 
7> y  (that is, a* > 1/2 > a).  (A3b) 
Under  assumption  (Al) we have  = 
qf aisd hence 
Z = (a - 
a*)q.  (4.6) 
It follows directly  from (4.6) and (4.3) that when the countries  have tise same risk 15 
aversion, (A3a), aggregate trade in nominal bonds is zero and the home country effectively 
exports and imports exactly half of the home and foreign stocks, 
Z=0andz=-z11-1/2.  (4.7) 
This is of  course the familiar perfectly pooled equilibrium. 
When the home country  is more risk averse, (A3b), the home country  in the 
aggregate exports nominal bonds, imports  less of foreign bonds, and exports more of home 
bonds, 
Z < 0. z1 <- 1/2, and  U < Zn < 1/2.  (4.8) 
Let us next examine the determinants  of the trade in indexed bonds, z0. 
Obviously, when the countries have the same risk aversion, there is zero trade in indexed 
bonds, 
= 0,  (4.9) 
since the countries are assumed to have the same intertemporal  preferences.  It follows that 
the capital  account is balanced, 
q0(z0 + Z) = 0.  (4.10) 
When the home country  is more risk averse, indexed bonds are imported by the home 
Country, 
z0 > 0.  (4.11) 
We can show (4.11) by comparing the home and foreign demand price for indexed 
bonds when no indexed bonds are traded, that is. (O) and (0), from (2.12) with 
= c(x2  coo  and  (4.12) 
= c*2c+0 
where we have exploited (A2) and Z* = - Z.  From the definitions of x2 and x2 in (2.11), we 
have x2 - x2 = (cs.  *)(,v2 
_ 
7\V17wW/2)  < 0, where  is the variance of world output. 
Further, by (4.8) y  - 
q0Z > y  + q0Z.  Since U(.)  is decreasing, it follows that q0(0) > 
which implies z0 > 0 by (2.13). 
Intuitively,  the more risk averse home country  has a lower certainty  equivalent risky 
period 2 income (x2 < xt2).  Absent trade in indexed bonds, the home country  has higher 16 
aeriod  1 consumption,  since it is a net exporter of risky assets.  Interteniporal substitution 
and equal time preferences then implies that the home country imports iidexed bonds to 
increase period 2 consumption and ricerease period 1 cOnsumption. 
What  can ve say about the capital account deficit q3(z0 + Z) when the home country 
is more risk averse?  Indexed bonds are imported, whereas nominal bonds are exported. 
What is the net?  It can actually  be densunstrated (see the appendix) that there is a capital 
account deficit, 
+ Z) > 0.  (4.13) 
The import of indexed bonds dominates over the export of nominal bonds.  The home 
country's  higher risk aversion leads it to save more than the foreign country, which 
translates  into positive net foreign investment. 
Let us next consider the situation when the foreign country still pursues a  nominal 
GDP target, but the home country  instead pursues an  (uncoordinated) exchange rate target, 
as specified in (3.8).  It follows from (3.5) that home nominal bonds then get the same risk 
characteristics as foreign nominal bonds so that these two assets become perfect substitutes. 
Foreign nominal bonds have, as before, risk characteristics equivalent  to foreign stocks.  In 
addition to the indexed bonds, there  is now effectively only one risky asset, namely foreign 
stocks.  We denote this by 
m = n = f.  (4.14) 
Since home and foreign nominal bonds are perfect substitutes,  only aggregate trade in 
them  matters, and the particular  composition of aggregate trade into trade in Isome and 
foreign bonds is irrelevant.  In terms of the real model in Section 2, we must then regard tbe 
trade vector of risky  assets z as  one- dimensional.  It is straightforward to verify, that all the 
expressions in Section 2 still hold when the relevant vectors and matrices  are reinterpreted 
as scalars, however.  For example, expected dividends and the variance  of  dividends on risky 
nominal bonds are given by the scalars 
=  and a = 
Uff.  (4.15) 
Using (4.15) in (2.8) and (2.9) we directly  get 17 
= zf = Cs - Oaf/uff and i = qf = v  - 7ef,  (4.16) 
where z denotes aggregate trade a noini  nal bonds. 
Under assumption (  A3a)  equal  ii  sk aversion, we have 
= (1  (T1fIffff)/2 ￿  0,  (4.17) 
where z is nonnegative by (Al); recall that 17hf 
<  Uff =  under (Al).  The home country 
diversifies its portfolio by importing the single risky asset, nominal bonds.  It follows, of 
course, that aggregate trade in nominal bonds is nonnegative, 
Z = qz ￿  0.  (4.18) 
It is easy to show that the import  of  nominal bonds is financed by export of indexed 
bonds, 
< 0.  (4.19) 
What about the capital account?  It can indeed be shown (see the appendix) that the 
capital account is balanced, 
q0(z0 + Z) = 0.  (4.20) 
If instead the home country is more risk averse, (A3b), we see  from (4.16) that it is 
no longer clear that the home country unambiguously imports nominal bonds.  If Cs*o.f < 
we have z < 0, that is, the home country exports nominal bonds.  The closer  to 
and the larger a  relative to Cs, the more  likely is  z < 0.  If this indeed happens, nominal 
bonds (equivalent  of foreign stocks) is a bad hedge for home output risk and it is better for 
the home  country to insure itself  by importing indexed bonds, which import is financed by 
export of nominal bonds.  \Vith regard to the aggregate capital account, it can be shown (see 
the appendix)  that 
sgn q0(z0 + Z) = sgn (7- 7*)[(1+z)_c/2 + a*(ff+11f)z].  (4.21) 
We see that if z > 0, the capital account is definitely in deficit.  But if z < 0-- because,  as 
explained  above, ehf is positive and  close  to  and  >> a--the capital  account may 
instead be in surplus.  In the latter case, a change from a nominal GDP target to an 
exchange rate target  thus causes the capital account to change sign. 
In summary,  a change from a nominal GDP rule to an exchange rate rule, when the 18 
foreign country has a  nominal ('.DP rule, clearly implies a different composition  of the 
capital  account.  If the two  countries  have the same risk aversion, the aggregate capital 
account is unchanged at zero.  But if the home country  is more risk averse, the capital 
account may change from deficit to surplus. 
h) Ilonie Exchange Rate Target vs. Home Tnflation  Target 
with a Foreign Nominal GDP Target 
We next look at the case when the foreign country  pursues a nominal GDP target, 
but the home country has an ioflation target. Then home bonds are perfect substitutes  for 
indexed bonds, whereas foreign bonds remain equivalent to foreign stocks, 
m=O,n=f.  (4.22) 
It follows that the effective availability of assets is equivalent to the case in (a) when 
the home country follows an exchange rate rule.  Assume now that the home country instead 
shifts to an exchange rate target.  That makes risky nominal home and foreign bonds perfect 
substitutes, 
m=n=f.  (4.23) 
Therefore, under our assumption that there are indexed bonds, the same array  of assets is 
effectively available, namely indexed bonds and risky nominal foreign bonds.  It follows that 
the equilibrium is effectively the same, as when the home  country  pursues an inflation 
target,  although the denomination of the traded  assets may change. 
c) Home Exchange Rate Target vs. Home Inflation Target 
with a Foreign Inflation Target 
\Vhen the home and foreign countries initially pursue  inflation targets, home and 
foreign bonds are both equivalent to indexed bonds.  There is effectively only one asset 
traded,  the indexed bond.  In our notation 
m = n = 0.  (4.24) 
When the countries have the same risk aversion, it follows (since the two countries 19 
arc equal  in all other respects) that there is  no trade and the capital  account is balanced, 
= 0.  (425) 
\Vlieu the home country  is more risk averse, we have 
x2 - x  = - ( 
- 7*)/2 <0,  (4.26) 
(we have used (Al)).  Absent trade in indexed bond, the certainty  equivalent period 2 
consumption is lower in the house country. It follows that the house country will import 
indexed bonds, 
> 0,  (4.27) 
and there will be a capital account deficit. 
When each country  pursues an inflation target, the exchange rate is constant.  1-lence 
it makes no difference if the home country instead pursues an exchange rate target. 
d) Home Exchange Bate Target vs. Tlorne Nominal (3DP Target 
with a Foreign Inflation Target 
When  the foreign country pursues an  inflation target and the home country pursues a 
nominal GDP target, the situation is of course the mirror image of the one discussed under 
b) above.  That is, 
m=h,n=0.  (4.28) 
The trade pattern in assets is determined  by the same  conditions as when the home country 
has an exchange rate target under a). 
If the home country instead pursues an exchange rate target, we  have 
= n = 0,  (4.29) 
that is, the availability  of assets is equivalent to the one discussed under c) above. 
If the two countries are equally risk averse, (A3a), the adoption of an exchange rate 
target does not change net foreign investment: it follows from the results above that the 
capital account stays at zero.  Flosvever, gross trade in assets is different.  \Vhule the home 
country trades (exports or imports) nominal bonds for indexed bonds with an inflation rule, 
gross trade is indetermisiate and may very well he zero with an exchange rate rule. 20 
If the home country  is more risk averse, (A3b), the situation  with an inflation rule is 
not exactly the mirror image of h), since now the more risk averse home country  can 
effectively trade its own stocks (rather than the other country's stocks as in b)).  The more 
risk averse home country  will always export its stocks, hence 
z=z1<OandZ=qz<0.  (4.30) 
By syllunetry one can derive an analog to (4.21), 
sgn q0(z0 + Z) = sgn (- 7*)[(1 zll)2h/2 
- 0(hll+hf)Zll].  (4.31) 
It follows  from (4.30) and (4.31) that the capital account is in deficit, 
q0(z0 + Z) > 0.  (4.32) 
There  is import of indexed bonds, and that dominates over export of risky home nominal 
bonds. 
With the exchange rate rule, there is  also a capital account deficit, as under c) above. 
e) Coordinated Exchanse Rate Tareets 
Let us finally consider two cases of coordinated exchange rate targets. The first one 
is trivial, namely when both countries, in addition  to the common exchange rate target, 
pursues a world inflation  target instead of individual inflation targets. It is easy to see that 
the asset availability in this case is equivalent to the one under c) above when both countries 
have individual inflation targets and the home  country  shifts to an  individual exchange rate 
target.  As under c) asset trade is thus unaffected by the change to a common exchange rate 
target. 
The other case is when the home  and foreign countries adopt a world norninai GDP 
target in addition to the common exchange rate target. Then home and foreign bonds are 
perfect substitutes  for risky claims to world output, 
m = n = w,  (4.33) 
with  expected dividends and variance 
w2 = 2  2  and  = 
Chll + _}f + ff.  (4.34) 
Using this and (Al) in (2.9), we have 21 
z = z  = (a - o*)a1/a  = (a - n*)/2.  (4.35) 
When the countries  have the same i'isk aversion, there is obviously no trade in either 
risky nominal bonds or indexed bonds, and a balanced capital account: 
z = 
z0 
= 0.  (4.36) 
It is natural to compare this outcome with the outcome when the two countries initially 
pursue individual nominal GOP targets,  w1iich is the first case analyzed under a).  There the 
capital account was also balanced, but there was gross trade in nominal bonds: the home 
country exporting  home bonds and importing foreign bonds. 
When the honie country  is more risk averse, (A3b), the adoption  of a common 
exchange rate target makes the home country  export risky nominal bonds 
z < 0  (4.37) 
(unless home and foreign Output are perfectly negatively correlated). 
What about trade in indexed bonds, and the sign of the capital account?  We know 
from the case discussed under heading c) that in the absence of trade in risky assets, there 
would be import of indexed bonds, and a capital account deficit.  Indeed, it can be shown 
(see appendix) that indexed bonds are imported, 
z0 > 0,  (4.38) 
and that indexed bonds import dominates over nominal bonds export so that that capital 
account is in deficit, 
q0(z0 + Z) > 0.  (4.39) 
In this case adopting an exchange rate target for monetary  policies would not cause a 
reversal of the capital account. 
5. Conclusions 
\Ve have investigated how different monetary policies affect the risk- return 
characteristics  of nominal assets and how this in turn affects real decisions-  - savings and 
portfolio allocations-- in an incomplete markets setting.  Our results indicate that one should 
not hope for any unambigous answers to the main question: how less exchange rate 22 
variability  influences  trade in assets  and  net foreign investment.  Depending on tbe initial 
policies at borne awl abroad, a monetary policy aiming at reduced exchange rate variability 
may imply very different effects on the trade pattern in assets.  Net foreign investment 
may- - on the one extreme- - not be affected  at all, or-  - on the other extreme— - change sign: 
from positive to negative, or from negative to positive. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the general question that we have addressed- - how real 
trade is affected by monetary and exchange rate policy in an  uncertain  world with 
incomplete markets- - is worth pursuing further.  We can think of  a number  of extensions of 
the simplistic framework in this paper.  Within  the context of  our model, we assumed the 
existence of indexed bonds throughout  the analysis.  Tius was mostly for analytical 
convenience; the model becomes much  harder  to solve if there are no indexed bonds. 
Unfortunately, the  assumption that indexed bonds are traded is not innocuous; it does affect 
the results in several of the cases that we considered. But we do believe that an extension 
without indexed bonds is feasible, however, and that such an extension is both well 
motivated  and interesting.  It is well motivated because international trade in indexed bonds 
is not empirically significant.  It is interesting because without  indexed bonds savings and 
portfolio decisions can not be  separated at all. 
The trade patterns and capital accounts discussed in our model are relative to 
autarky. This means that the "capital account" is somewhat a misnomer.  Discussions of 
capital movements meaning changes in portfolios over time requires a  framework with 
several periods, which raises many well known technical difficulties.1S  Also, the comparisons 
between different policy regimes are of course comparisons of different equilibria with given 
regimes, not analysis of changes over time in equilibria from changes over time in policy.  A 
proper analysis of the latter is also associated with well known difficulties.  It may be that 
one can make some progress ems the effect of policy changes by analyzing our model witis 
arbitrary (instead of zero) initial portfolios, and then letting the initial portfolios represent 
15  See Dumas (1986) for a model where portfolio adjustment  takes place over time. 23 
the Steady— slate portfolios  ii  particular policy regimes. 
The niudel could he extended to include investment  in physical capital, so as to make 
possible a richer analysis of the link between exchange rate risk and foreign invcstment.11 Oie 
could  also include more than one good and analyze the connection between exchange rate 
risk and foreign (ateinporal)  ti ade.1a  It is sometimes argued that the main effect of nominal 
exchange rate variability  is to cause real exchange rate variability,  that is, relative goods 
price variability.  For exchange rate risk to be associated with relative price risk one has to 
incorporate predetermined  or 'sticky' goods prices, however. 
The sources of uncemainty  in the model is period 2 outputs and possibly period 2 
money supplies.  One may  wonder what effect uncertainty  in money demands would have. 
It is not difficult to incorporate uncertain money demand velocity as a separate  source of 
uncertainty.  It is easy to see that the benchmark monetary policies of stabilizing nominal 
GOP, stabilizing inflation/the  price level,  and stabilizing nominal exchange rates have 
exactly  the same consequences as when velocity is certain.  These policy rules have well 
defined effects on the real returns on nominal bonds independently of what type of shocks 
are present.  1-lowever, with uncertain velocity a passive policy rule of constant money 
supply is no longer equivalent to stabilizing nominal GOP, and in that case nonainal bonds 
are no longer equivalent to claims to output. 
Since the agents are optimizing and there are well- defined utility levels, it is 
tempting to use the model to discuss the welfare consequences of monetary  policies.  This 
should be done with great care, though.  Our setup with incomplete markets  has an inherent 
bias against exchange rate stabilizing policy, since such policy generally reduces the number 
of available assets and hence reduces the scope for risk- sharing.  Of course, it should also  he 
remembered that our model does riot incorporate the informational frictions that make 
international  financial markets  incomplete.  Any normative analysis would therefore rest on 
l  Gordon and Varian (1986) do include physical investment  in their real  one-good 
model of asset trade. 
12  Grossman and Razin (19S5)  discuss how real trade flows are affected by uncertainty 
in a Ricardia.n trade model where asset (stock) markets are incomplete. 24 
shaky foundations. 
One may, of course, also criticize our positive analysis on the sanse  grounds.  Put 
differeoty, ee own critleisni of the portfolio balance approach for not inclnding individual 
maxinlzatioo  and shns being subject to the "Locas Critique', can be  made of our owil 
analysis for not including the reasons why markets  are incomplete.  Given the svell known 
difficulties to conic up with a  satisfactory  explanation for the existence of nominal contracts, 
we suspect that an attempt to derive the asset structure  from first principles would violate 
the starting point for our whole analysis, namely the absointe preponderance of  oominal 
contracts in international financial markets. 25 
A  I)DOfldix 
We want to derive (4.13),  (4.20) and (4.21).  Suppose temporarily that the capital 
account  is zero, that is, 
= -  Z.  (Al) 
Then we have 
q0(-Z)  = U(x2 + Z)/tJ(y')  and  q0(Z) = Uc(x*2 
- Z)/U(y).  (A.2) 
Under assumptions (Al) and (A2) it fohows that 
sign q0(z0 + Z) = - sign [(x2 + Z) - (x2  -  Z)] = sign [2Z -  (x2 -  x*2)1.  (A.3) 
First consider the case (4.2): m = 
11,  n = f.  Unrler assumption (Al), it follows from 
(4.4) and (4.5) that 
Z = (  *)q1  = (  *)(2 7Wa)  (A.4) 
Also, as discussed immediately after (4.12), 
2  2  * w2  w  *  -2  w  x  - x  =  ' 7  eww! = (o  )(2y - 7 
(A.5) 
where the last equality follows since  =  + eff + 2ehf = 2(ehlI+f) = 
Thus, we get 
2Z - (x2x*2) = (* w)7"eWh.  (A.6) 
Substituting  (AG) into (A.3) proves (4.13). 
Next consider the case (4.14): m = n = f.  From (4.15) and the definition (2.4), the 
variances of consumption  are 
=  + Zc1f + 2zehf  and  (A.7) 
= 
iYff+ zaff  2ZJ1f.  (A.7*) 
From (A.7) and the definitions of x2 and  x*2, one can, after some manipulations, derive 
x2 -  x2 = 2z(2- 7Cf) 
- 
(l+z)2eff-  (- ')2z.  (AS) 
The expression for qf = q in (4.16) and the definition of  allow us to rewrite (A.S) as 
x2 - x2 =  2Z - (  7*)((l+z)2U/2 - u*zef).  (A.9) 
It follows that 26 
2Z - (x2x*2) = (  )((1+z)2eff/2 
- azcf),  (A.10) 
which together with  (A.3) pi.oves (4.20) and (4.21). 
It is easy to verify that if the conditions in the text are fulfIlled, q0(z0 + Z)  may well 
be negative in this case.  To see this substitute the equilibrium value of z from  (4.16)  into 
(4.21).  As an example let the critical parameter  values be 7  2,  = 1 and hf = 
7Of/S. 
Straightforward  calculations  show  that q0(z0 + Z) = -  1/8. 
Let us finally consider the case m = n = w and demonstrate  (4.3S)  and (4.39). Under 
(Al) we have 
a = yV2 = 22,  =  = 
2(allll+ehf), 
and eliw = fw = hh+Jhi  (All) 
It follows from (2.8) and (2.9) that 
q =  =  2y2 - 2(%l5+hf) and  (A.12) 
z =  (*)/9  (A.13) 
This and some  algebra gives 
_9  _9,  9 
2Z -  (x  -  x*_) = ( 7)(°ll  + %f)[Olth/2(o•l.ih+hf)  - z].  (A.14) 
We have z2  1/4 by (A.13) (z2 < 1/4 for 7> 0 and 'K > 0), and we  have 
1/4 by 1if  hh (cllIl/2(llh+elIf) > 1/4 for 1if < hh)  Hence, for either positive 
absolute risk aversion or home and foreign output less than perfectly correlated,  we get 
2Z- (x2-  x*2) >0,  (A.15) 
and this together with  (A.3) implies (4.3S) and (4.39). 27 
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